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Abstract 
 
 
 
The growing literature on transnationalism documents the ways in which immigrants and 
refugees stay connected with their communities and countries of origin and shows how 
homeland governments reach out to their former constituents. Social, financial and political 
ties are extended across borders. We know little, however, about the specific ways in which 
oppositional transnational political practices are shaped and made effective. What is more, 
research on transnational political practices has often limited itself to investigations of the 
connections between nation-states. This paper illustrates how transnational political practices 
articulate different levels of policy making (local, national, supra-national) in ways that 
multiply the effectiveness of engagement at any one site. It will be shown that homeland 
political activists can effectively shape the homeland political agenda through the 
mobilization of immigrants‟ and refugees‟ associations and institutions in multilevel 
constructions of networks, constituting a space of political engagement that needs to be 
considered in its own right. 
 
Keywords: transnationalism, linguistic and ethnic minorities, discourse framing, Kurdish 
nationalism, Turkey-EU accession negotiations. 
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Introduction  
 
 
This paper describes how the networks of politically self-aware national or ethnic groups 
active in a certain country can be extended to include significant communities outside the 
„homeland‟. This extension of the actors involved at different sites allows the oppositional 
homeland political actors to push their demands upwards to supra-national levels of political 
organization, which leads to pressure on homeland governments and institutional 
arrangements. But in addition to showing how this mobilization brings these resources to bear 
on change in the homeland, the case studied also shows how they give rise to new spaces of 
political engagement. The full significance of those spaces remains relatively unconsidered in 
existing studies of transnationalism. The particular case of how a Kurdish Mayor of Turkey‟s 
main pro-Kurdish opposition party managed to inscribe the demand for multilingual services 
into the Turkey-EU accession negotiations will serve to demonstrate how new spaces of 
political engagement come into being and successfully shape political agendas. 
 
Data for this paper were collected from February to October 2007 and in March and April of 
2008. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Europe (Brussels and Strasbourg) and in 
Turkey (Diyarbakir, Ankara and Istanbul) with leading members of the main politically active 
Kurdish associations, members of human rights organizations, politicians, academics, 
intellectuals and journalists, as well as with politicians in Europe who have engaged 
themselves with „the Kurdish question‟ and thus have become mediators to certain levels of 
organization. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, I took part in Kurdish delegations 
to the European Parliament in Brussels and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Interviewing 
and making observations was important to find out what initiatives the subjects under study 
had proceeded and were planning to undertake. As I was researching what could be called an 
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political activist „elite‟, for whom it was of strategical importance not to reveal their activities 
very openly (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002), approaching them personally, conducting long 
conversations with them, and in particular observing them in their daily activities provided me 
with a kind of information that could not be gathered upon the basis of classical quantitative 
surveys. The interviews as well as the observations provided insight into the networks and 
their spatial arenas, the political demands and discourses, and the political activities directed 
towards members of the European institutions. This paper is written from an agency-oriented 
perspective, which incorporates the ways actors present their problems and develop coalitions 
(Smith & Bakker, 2005).  
 
In the first section of the article I begin by discussing the significance for transnational 
political practices of network articulation over multiple policy levels, as wells as the 
importance of „frame bridging‟ therein. I then explore the case of Mayor Demirbaş and the 
Municipality of Sur. This case shows how networks and assemblages between different levels 
(local, national, supra-national) are constructed and how these new configurations reach 
beyond the limited boundaries of the nation-states in which the organizations that comprise 
them are presumably embedded. Special attention is given to the importance of „frame 
bridging‟ in the construction of networks of state and non-state actors over these multiple 
levels as a discursive strategy to successfully set political agendas. In the final section, the 
supportive role of Kurdish associations of the European Kurdish diaspora in these 
transnational political practices is explained in detail. 
 
 
1. Transnational political practices and multi-level network constructions  
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The literature on transnationalism is proliferating. However, most of it is concerned with: (1) 
the contacts immigrants sustain with their country of origin and the ways they give shape to 
transnational communities (Westwood & Phizaklea, 2000; Nell, 2004), (2) the effects of 
transnationalism on assimilation (Guarnizo et al. 2003), (3) the policy pursued by the sending 
country‟s government to sustain the loyalty of emigrant nationals (Portes, 1999: Margheritis, 
2007), or (4) the explanatory factors for immigrants‟ transnational political engagement 
(Eccarius-Kelly, 2002; Adamson, 2001; Ögelman, 2003). Less attention has been given to the 
transnational political practices instigated by oppositional homeland political actors and to the 
multi-level network construction these actors engage in. My concern here is to use the case of 
Mayor Demirbaş to demonstrate how oppositional homeland political actors mobilize 
leverage, paying particular attention to the ways in which the articulation of networks across 
various sites of political engagement multiplies the effectiveness of their actions. With the 
exceptions of Shain (2002), Al-Ali & Koser (2002) and Grojean (2008), the literature lacks 
case studies that try to asses the effectiveness of transnational political practices. 
 
Several authors have explored the transnational dimensions of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey 
(see, for example, Wahlbeck, 1999; Van Bruinessen, 2000; Lyon & Uçarer, 2001; Eccarius-
Kelly, 2002; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003, Watts, 2004; Grojean, 2008). However, most studies 
have confined themselves to the transnational political practices of immigrants and refugees 
living in Germany, where Turkish and Kurdish residents account for one third of all 
foreigners and compromise 30% of the asylum stock (Sirkeci, 2006: 74).
1
. A 2003 study on 
the transnational political practices of Kurds and Turks in Germany found lobbying towards 
supra-national institutions to be a rare phenomenon (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).  
Nevertheless, in a comparative exploration of the theoretically existing political opportunities 
for Kurdish nationalist activists in Turkey, Germany and the European Union, Vera Eccarius-
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Kelly (2002) foresaw an increase in the transnational political practices of Turkey‟s Kurds 
towards the European institutions. The case presented here demonstrates that these predictions 
have been realized. However, it also shows that the study of the transnational political 
practices of Turkey‟s Kurds can no longer be confined to the study of transnational relations 
between home and receiving states, but that the political claim-making of Kurdish political 
activists needs to incorporate research on multiple levels of policy-making.  
 
Transnationalism studies seek to overcome „methodological nationalism‟ and „methodological 
territorialism‟ (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002). Methodological nationalism is the assumption that 
all social relations are organized on a national scale or are becoming nationalized (Brenner, 
2004: 38). „Methodological territorialism‟ is the assumption that all social relations are 
organized within self-enclosed, discretely bounded territorial containers (Brenner, 2004: 38). 
However, although most authors avoid the trap of methodological nationalism, most studies 
on transnationalism still tend to be restricted to the transactions of ideas, people and material 
between the home state and the receiving state (see, for example, Portes, 2001, Guarnizo et 
al., 2003; Argun, 2003). Therefore, the trap of „methodological territorialism‟ is not entirely 
overcome, since the transnational political practices are still situated primarily in and between 
the national territories of the home and receiving states.  If we follow the different trajectories 
of the actors involved, however, we see that transnational political practices oriented towards 
homeland political situations involve more actors and levels of policy-making than typically 
presumed. Furthermore, we also see how these organizations and connections are constitutive 
of a distinct political space − or „space of political engagement‟ − that deserves to be studied 
in its own right. A space of political efficacy and performance is created that, in many ways, 
stands apart from the traditional levels of political organization (e.g., municipality, nation-
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state, EU, etc.). Concepts that are crucial to understanding the making of this space and its 
political significance include the notions of „network articulation‟ and „frame bridging‟.  
 
The case of Mayor Demirbaş and Sur demonstrates how marginalized actors manage to press 
their claims through engagement at spatial levels of policy-making (for other examples, see 
Haarstad & Fløysand, 2007 and Smith & Guarnizo, 1998). By developing networks that 
articulate multiple sites and levels of political organization, movements can circumvent the 
historically entrenched political hierarchies (Smith 1995). The ability to press claims at 
multiple levels of policy-making enhances the effectiveness of an otherwise local opposition 
group. A „new political space‟ is developed, outside the boundaries of the nation-state. This 
spatial configuration is composed of networks of social, cultural and economic relations and 
occupied by the conscious association of actors in separate locations linking themselves via 
networks for specific political and social ends (Marden, 1997). The spatial configuration 
resembles what Thomas Faist has defined as a „transnational social space‟: that is, a space 
consisting of „combinations of sustained social and symbolic ties, their contents, positions in 
networks and organizations, that can be found in multiple states‟ (Faist, 2000:199). This new 
political space has the ability to change the relationship between the marginalized and the 
dominant, and as such it is a form of empowerment. Our case study demonstrates the complex 
spatial power configurations that emerge through engagement in transnational political 
practices. These configurations involve Kurdish politicians in southeast Turkey, Kurdish 
associations in Europe, immigrant media, non-governmental organisations, national 
politicians in the states in which Kurdish immigrants are residing, along with international 
advocacy groups and members of supra-national institutions, etc. Networks are constructed 
and maintained that make it possible to articulate issues at higher levels to mobilize leverage 
(Haarstad & Floysand, 2007).  
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However, the production of such a space depends crucially on the effectiveness and flexibility 
of discursive strategies. Gaining access to influential politicians at different levels of policy-
making requires deliberation over the discourses that will be employed. The success of 
transnational political practices depends on choosing the right problems to present as rallying 
points and paying attention to how these problems are presented or framed. Interest groups 
thus adapt their discourse and narratives to institutional realities.  Vis-à-vis European 
institutions, Kurdish groups have successfully framed their concerns in terms of human rights 
and democracy (see also Adamson, 2001; Natali, 2005; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Frames 
help to interpret problems, to define problems for action and suggest pathways to remedy the 
problem. They enable (re)interpretation and representation, and help to (re)define grievances 
and claims. Social movements are involved in struggles over meaning as they attempt to 
influence policy − hence, an essential task is to frame problems and injustices in a way that 
convinces a wide and diverse audience of the necessity for, and utility of, attempts to redress 
them. Consequently, frames are not given but rather created and transformed in the process of 
contestation (Zald, 1996). Whether the information that is distributed will lead to common 
action depends on whether different actors will identify with the cause of concern (Tarrow & 
Mc Adam, 2003).  The symbols, narratives and metaphors that are used by those who speak 
out must resonate with those of other actors; otherwise, they will fail to convey the meaning 
that the speaker intends (Hardy et al., 2000). Such actors are engaging in „frame bridging‟ 
(Snow & Benford, 2000). Section 2 of this paper provides a lively example of how discourses 
are framed in order to successfully influence policy-makers at different levels. The case 
demonstrates how Kurdish associations and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party 
(Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP) have developed their own particular narrative of this 
discourse on democracy, deploying it to renegotiate their position in relations of power 
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(Haarstad & Fløysand, 2007). First, however, I briefly sketch the contours of the Kurdish 
question in Turkey. 
 
 
2. Lobbying the EU: the case of Mayor Demirbaş  
 
Lobbying against the background of the accession negotiations 
In 2005, the EU gave the green light to open accession negotiations with Turkey. This 
sparked debates in Europe about the authority of Turkey‟s democratic credentials, and the 
position of Turkey‟s Kurdish minority. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore 
the limits of Turkish democracy, it is important to note that the ideology underpinning 
dominant state institutions forecloses the political opportunities of groups who identify 
themselves outside of it. According to Dorronsoro (2005), the Turkish political system can be 
defined as a „security regime‟: a meta-ideology of „national security‟ is central to the Turkish 
political system, and it stands particularly central to the ideological foundation of the regime 
that followed the 1980 military coup (Dorronsoro, 2005). This meta-ideology is present 
within the various political ideologies in Turkey and, more importantly, it dictates what can 
and cannot be regarded as politically legitimate. This hegemonic idea of the overall 
importance of national security justifies interventions by the security services and the 
judiciary in the areas of political parties, social activities, the distribution of information, the 
media, education, and so on (Dorronsoro, 2005). This meta-ideology also enables 
mobilization around the themes of internal and international plotters who seek to de-stabilize, 
or even destroy, the Turkish state and society.  The Kurdish nationalist movement is regarded 
as one of the main threats to the integrity of the identity and territorial conceptualization 
underpinning Turkey‟s national institutions and, hence, as a threat to national security.  The 
roots of the Kurdish question in Turkey can be traced back to the 1920s, the first decade 
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following the founding of the modern Turkish state, which abolished the Caliphate and 
introduced a centralized authority affecting the long time quasi-autonomy the Kurdish 
provinces had enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire (see Taspinar, 2005; Mc Dowall, 1996). 
These developments exacerbated a legitimacy crisis for the nationalist-secularist Ankara 
government in the Kurdish provinces. A national education system and military service were 
installed which served as instruments for the „Turkificiation‟ of the Kurdish inhabitants in the 
Southeast of the Country. In answer to these changes Kurdish dissidents started to organize 
themselves and staged rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s (Taspinar, 2005). As the rebellions 
were crushed by severe military repression it took until the end of the 1960s for Kurdish 
dissidents to political organize themselves again. During the last thirty years the Kurdish 
nationalist movement however managed to gain substantial support among the Kurdish 
population in Turkey and turn itself into a mass movement (Romano, 2006).
2
 
 
In the early 1990s, Turkey experienced a first period of liberalization under late president 
Turgut Özal. This opened public discussion about the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity 
of the country − a discussion that was brought to the fore by the Iraqi-Kurdish refugee crisis 
on Turkey‟s border following the 1991 Gulf War. Prior to that, the central discourse had been 
that Kurds could become Turkish (Yeğen, 2007). Every inhabitant of the country was 
considered to be a Turkish citizen and was expected to speak the Turkish language. In fact, 
during several periods in the last century, the private and public use of the Kurdish language 
was officially forbidden. Up to this day, politicians are still required to speak in Turkish.  
 
Since 1984, an armed conflict has been fought between the Kurdistan Workers‟ Party or PKK 
and the Turkish army. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the conflict and the subsequent violations 
of human rights drew attention − nationally and internationally − to the reality of the Kurdish 
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question. The armed conflict led to significant repression of the Kurds living in southeastern 
Turkey. The repression and the climate of insecurity led many Kurds to flee the rural areas 
and to settle in big cities in western Turkey or to apply for asylum in Europe (Sirkeci, 2000, 
Romano 2006). Exact numbers of the amount of Turkish Kurds currently residing in the West 
of Europe are unavailable, as ethnicity is not registered. Several authors have estimated the 
number around 650 000 by the mid-1990s (White, 2000; Van Bruinessen, 1998), but the 
number is still considered speculative (Sirkeçi, 2006: 68-69).  The repression by the Turkish 
army and security forces was found to be partly responsible for shaping the opportunities for 
the PKK to become a mass movement in Turkey (Romano, 2006). The development towards 
a mass movement gave shape to the rise of civil society organizations and political parties 
working within the ideological sphere of the PKK. One of these parties is the DTP, and its 
Mayor‟s actions are the focus of our case study.  
 
Kurdish activists consider the EU-Turkey accession negotiation period as one during which 
the brokers of Kurdish organizations and parties will have the best bargaining position to 
realize change at home. Yet they are aware of the power imbalances. As a state actor, Turkey 
has many more opportunities to propagate its views about the political situation in Turkey at 
the level of the European Union. Especially, as this entails unrest and reports of human rights 
abuses in the Kurdish heartland of Southeast Anatolia and the armed conflict with the PKK. 
During the period of the accession negotiations, Turkey has regular contacts with all the 
members of the European Commission, as well as with the Council of Ministers, with whom 
the final decision concerning accession rests. Although „the Kurdish question‟ is presented by 
Kurdish politicians as the most important problem for the future of Turkey, it is only of 
secondary importance to the negotiating states. They consider the European Union primarily 
an economic union, and are still debating the political integration of Europe.  
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Notwithstanding these power imbalances, Kurdish organizations and the main pro-Kurdish 
party are actively engaged in transnational political practices, making use of the political 
opportunities at multiple levels of policy-making. Via the development of networks of both 
governmental and non-governmental actors, sites of cooperation are being developed that cut 
across established hierarchies (Khaler, 2006). Lobby activities are being directed towards 
members of the European Parliament, members of the Council of Europe and, to a lesser 
extent, towards members of the European Commission. Additionally, the legislative and 
judiciary bodies in Turkey are influenced indirectly by Turkey‟s many convictions on charges 
of human rights violations by the European Court of Human Rights. These convictions 
increase the legitimacy of the demands being made by Kurdish lobbyists and make it easier to 
advance claims about Turkey‟s policies towards its Kurdish minority.  
 
Mayor in action  
 
On 15 March 2007, thirty members of the European Parliament addressed the following letter 
to the Turkish Minister of the Interior: 
 
                        
Dear Minister of the Interior, 
We as members of the European Parliament are highly concerned about your appeal of 
5 January 2007 for the dismissal of the Mayor of Sur Municipality Abdullah Demirbas 
and the dissolution of the Sur Municipal Council.  
The initiative of the Sur Municipality to adopt multilingualism in their municipal 
services for the local public is highly necessary, according to a public survey carried 
out in 2006. According to this survey, 72% of the local residents speak Kurdish. In 
order to fulfil its duties and responsibilities properly and in order to meet the demands 
of its inhabitants, it is of vital importance for the municipality to have a lively 
exchange with its residents.  
One of the governing principles of European Union politics is the concept of “Unity in 
Diversity”. With this political guideline, the European Union has grown to an entity of 
27 States with more than 27 official languages.  
In consideration of the above, we urge you, Mr. Aksu, and the Turkish authorities to 
reconsider your appeal for the impeachment of Mayor Demirbas and to respect the 
diversity of Turkey, especially with regard to the upcoming accession talks of the 
chapter “Youth and Culture”.3 
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By the end of June 2007, Abdullah Demirbaş, Mayor of Sur, the centre of Diyarbakir, the 
largest Kurdish city in Turkey, was flying to Europe for the second time in two months. He 
and his municipal council had been removed from office as the result of the Turkish High 
Court decision stating that the organization of municipal services − such as the dissemination 
of information on culture, hygiene, health, domestic violence and environment in the city − 
could not be delivered in any language other than Turkish. The Sur municipality‟s decision 
had been made on the basis of a survey conducted among 8,920 households in the 
municipality. As the members of the European Parliament noted, 72% of those responding to 
the survey identified Kurdish as their mother tongue. Only 24% identified themselves as 
native speakers of Turkish. The remaining gave Arabic, Armenian and Syriac to be their 
language of daily life. Based on the results of the survey, Demirbaş agreed with Osman 
Baydemir, the Major of Greater Diyarbakir, to implement a multilingual local policy.  As a 
result of this agreement, Demirbaş had arrived in Brussels with a prison sentence of one to 
three years hanging over his head. Confronted with dismissal and prosecution, Demirbaş 
sought to mobilize sympathy and support in Europe.  
 
The first time the Mayor called for a multilingual approach to municipal services in front of 
an international audience was at the January 2006 European Social Forum in Athens, Greece. 
Before and after the municipality‟s announcement of its decision to organize multilingual 
municipal services, this policy was discussed within the Council of Europe, seeking for their 
approval.
4
 
 
One of the effects of the armed conflict has been an increased prejudice against the use of the 
Kurdish language by politicians, which is generally associated with the separatist claims of 
the PKK. Thus, the case of Mayor Demirbaş and the Sur municipality is an unparalleled 
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political initiative in the region. No other mayor or municipal council in Turkey has openly 
engaged in the public use of Kurdish. Mayors, as well as the staff of municipalities run by the 
DTP, do use Kurdish in day-to-day relations with their constituents, but they have never 
attempted to adopt its use through an official decision by their municipal councils. DTP 
Brussels considers this case a „test‟ for Turkey. But the decision to take up and draw attention 
to this particular case is no coincidence − the strategy has been well thought-out and carefully 
planned by the Kurdish „lobbyists‟, who aim to gain the sympathy of a broad and international 
audience.  
 
Because of the 10% threshold for parliamentary representation in Turkey, the main pro-
Kurdish party lacked political presence in Parliament until the latest elections in July 2007. 
This lack of national political representation encouraged some of the democratically elected 
Kurdish mayors to organize themselves internationally.
5
 In May 2007, Mayor Demirbaş first 
took part in a delegation of the DTP
6
-Brussels to the European Parliament. This trip was 
organized by the director of the Kurdish Institute in Brussels, and sought to draw attention to 
the threat of dismissal faced by the Mayor and his Council. Mayor Demirbaş presented his 
case to several members of the European Parliament (EP), and a press conference was hosted 
by a Belgian Member of European Parliament (MEP) from the Flemish Green party
7
. During 
the press conference in the European Parliament, the Mayor stated: „We believe that different 
cultures can live together in unity, and the best example of this is the European Union.‟ 
(personal notes, 9 May 2007) 
 
One month later, the Mayor‟s agenda included the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, where 
short informal meetings were organized on the spot. Meetings were held through the 
intermediation of Kurdish journalists involved in the production of Kurdish media (directed at 
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the Kurds at home and abroad) and through the intermediation of members of Europe-based 
Kurdish pressure groups comprising Kurdish political refugees. Accompanied by the 
European representative of the DTP, Demirbaş visited members of the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (who promote local and regional democracy 
among the member states of the Council of Europe) as well as members of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) from different European countries
8
. Those visited 
included observers of the last monitoring committee of the human rights situation in Turkey. 
As he had done earlier to the Members of the European Parliament, Demirbaş explained to the 
members of the Council of Europe (CE) that he and his council had decided to organize 
multilingual municipal services on the basis of a survey that gave evidence of the multilingual 
reality of the municipality.  In the future, services would be provided in Turkish, Kurdish, 
Syriac, Arabic, Armenian and, to encourage tourism, English. However, only hours after the 
Mayor had announced these plans, a judicial investigation had been launched upon the request 
of Turkey‟s Minister of the Interior, so he explained.   
Mayor Demirbaş:  
This decision handicaps minorities and pretends as if their language does not 
exist. […] 
Senior member of the Council of Europe: 
I totally agree with you! Language is existential. There is the aspect of cultural 
identity and the aspect of communication, as well as the democratic aspect. 
This is the standpoint which I defend within the European Union as well.
9
 
 
Demirbaş argued that, on the very day he was removed from office because of his 
multilingual initiative, Turkey turned to the United Nations to insist on the implementation of 
measurements to safeguard the language of Turkish-speaking citizens in Kosovo. On the other 
hand Turkey was requesting from Germany to acknowledge Turkish as a second language.  
 
Mayor Demirbaş:  
Thus they want protection for the Turkish language for their own people, but at 
the same time they fired me.
10
  
 
 16 
Furthermore, Demirbaş and the DTP European representative stressed that Turkish authorities 
responded repressively to an initiative that, would be considered standard procedure in 
European countries such as Belgium or Spain. Picking up on the criticisms expressed in 
previous progress reports by the European Commission, the DTP delegation characterized the 
Turkish measures as clear illustrations of the freezing of reform by Ankara.
11
 
  
Member of the post-monitoring committee of the Council of Europe: 
What was the the legal basis of this decision [to dismiss the Mayor and the 
Council]? 
Mayor Demirbaş:  
It is forbidden to use other languages besides Turkish. It is in contradiction 
with the Constitution. 
Member:   
But a law was accepted to allow for the use of Kurdish in education and 
broadcasting? 
Mayor Demirbaş:   
Well, this reaction of Turkey shows that these were merely „make-up‟. I have 
been in Compostella and have seen how Spanish, Galician and English is used. 
We want to do the same. In Europe there is a mentality in favour of 
multilingualism.
12
 
 
That the Mayor and the council had been dismissed − with criminal prosecution and possible 
prison sentences − as the consequence of their decision to organise multilingual communal 
services did not fall on deaf ears in the EP and the CE. The Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities had already been informed about the developments through letters from Mayor 
Baydemir and the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). The UCLG includes 
municipalities from all over the world and is committed to local democracy and autonomy 
and participative local governance. Membership in this union allows the municipality of 
Diyarbakir to have a more direct impact on the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of 
the Council of Europe since they have many overlapping memberships.
13
 So, the Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities was happy to announce that it would send a delegation to 
Diyarbakir to see if there were impediments to the guaranty of local democracy.
 14   
Members 
of PACE promised to criticize Turkish members of the Council and to write letters of concern 
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to the Turkish Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior. Mayor Demirbaş was advised to 
take his case to the European Court of Human Rights if no further appeal were possible on the 
national (Turkish) level.
15
  
 
When evaluating Turkey‟s progress regarding EU membership criteria, the European 
Commission‟s progress report of 6 November 2007 explicitly referred to the court ruling on 
the case of Sur municipality in pointing out that no measures had been taken to facilitate 
access to public services for non-Turkish speakers:  
„No measures have been taken to facilitate access to public services for non-speakers 
of Turkish, although interpretation is usually available in courts. In a case against the 
municipality of Sur in June 2007 the Council of State dismissed the Mayor from office 
and dissolved the Municipal Council for providing multilingual municipal services.‟ 
 
For the organizations involved in lobbying, access to the members of the Enlargement 
Commission (which is part of the European Commission) is limited, but the case did show up 
on this commission‟s agenda nonetheless. The Enlargement Commission is to support and 
monitor Turkey in its legislative reforms.  The Kurdish question, which is cautiously 
discussed as an individual human rights problem, is being discussed directly with the Turkish 
authorities. However, when it comes to information gathering on the human rights situation in 
Turkey, the Commission relies mainly on the information it gathers through its delegation in 
Ankara and the Turkey experts in Brussels.
16
 The Ankara delegation of the European 
Commission, as well as its Turkish Unit in Brussels, base their reports on the 
recommendations of the Council of Europe and international institutions and the information 
that is distributed by international human rights organizations.
17
 The international human 
rights organisations receive information from various Kurdish human rights organizations and 
parties, which is then investigated and, if confirmed, made public. Demirbaş‟ case came to be 
mentioned specifically in the July 2007 briefing paper on human rights concerns in Turkey − 
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first in the lead up to the election (Human Rights Watch, 2007), in the Council of Europe‟s 
report of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities and later that year in the European 
Commission‟s Progress Report of November 2007. 
 
Questioning the boundaries of the legitimate 
In August 2007, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities sent a fact-finding mission to 
Sur/Diyarbakir and Ankara. The mission‟s final report states the following:  
„For the Congress and for the maintenance of high standards of local authority 
autonomy, the dismissal of elected local government officials by means other than 
popular vote is plainly a matter of the highest importance…‟ (CG/BUR (14)29REV2: 
3).  
 
In its concluding statements, the report demanded that the government of Turkey take Kurdish 
language rights into serious consideration, given the European Commission‟s and the EU 
Parliament‟s demands to draft a new civil constitution. The Congress invited the newly 
elected Turkish Minister of the Interior to the November 2007 autumn session of the 
Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg to „outline the policy that the new government of 
Turkey intends to follow with regard to these issues.‟ The report stated further that:  
„the Congress should encourage the Turkish government, as it ventures on a new phase 
of reform and modernisation, to underpin its commitment to diversity and pluralism by 
signing the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.‟ (CG/BUR 
(14)29REV2: 6) 
 
Subsequently, Mayor Demirbaş, together with Mayor Baydemir of Greater Diyarbakir, took 
the floor at the November 2007 session of the PACE in Strasbourg. This event greatly 
embarrassed other Turkish mayors present, some of whom began to cross-examine the two 
mayors like state prosecutors arguing at a highly politicized court case. To the disappointment 
of the members of the Congress for Local and Regional authorities, neither Turkey‟s Minister 
of the Interior, nor any other high-ranking official, turned up at the session.
18
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Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, Watts has described how Kurdish politicians in the 
southeast engage in „symbolic-politics‟ by using Kurdish in their municipalities (Watts 
2006b). What happens is that Kurdish politicians act „as if‟ new rights and freedoms are in 
place. Engaging in the frameworks of the European Institutions and the current discourses on 
improving the democratic standards of Turkey, they act, confrontationally, „as if‟ they occupy 
a political space within which this initiative is legitimate. Keeping in mind that Turkey can be 
regarded as a „security regime‟ with the fear of national and territorial disintegration at the 
core of its meta-ideology, the political initiatives in Sur municipality consciously intend to 
stretch the boundaries of what can be considered legal and legitimate behaviour within 
Turkey‟s boundaries (Wedeen, in Watts, 2006b). The initiative for providing multilingual 
services, taken by the Mayor and his council, obviously has juridical repercussions. From the 
standpoint of the Kurdish lobbyists, the juridical harassment in this case reveals what they 
perceive to be the current condition of democracy in Turkey and the lack of serious political 
reforms. By exposing this reality to the outside world − and, more specifically, to members of 
the union of States with which Turkey is in a bargaining position − the Kurdish party, 
supported by the Kurdish organizations in Europe, can embarrass Turkey and may thus 
indirectly force its authorities to lift the charges in certain much-discussed court cases. If they 
succeed in this political embarrassment (Hobson, et al., 2007), they will be stretching the 
boundaries of what is considered legal or illegal and thus giving shape to what they think the 
democratization of Turkey should be like.  
 
Enhancing democracy  
Kurdish lobbyists share a discourse that emphasizes the importance of enhancing democracy 
within Turkey. Kurdish organizations and the DTP generally place the Kurdish question, and 
thus themselves, in a key position within a narrative on the democratization of Turkey. In 
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their narration of the political situation, democracy will reign only once the Kurdish question 
in Turkey is resolved. In this way, they pose the Kurdish question as the root cause of the lack 
of democracy in Turkey. In their opinion, Turkey‟s policy towards the Kurds reveals the 
power of the military over civil power, the lack of human rights, the centralist character of 
political authority and the intolerant character of Turkish nationalism. In contrast, the Kurdish 
politicians demand restriction of the military‟s power and enforcement of civilian authority, 
the decentralization of political power, and the organization of a multi-cultural society, with 
respect for people‟s language, culture and religion.  
 
The demands of the Kurdish organisations fit within the frames of the Parliament of Europe 
and the Council of Europe. Many MEPs personally regard the European Parliament as the 
most democratic and idealistic institution of Europe and bear witness to the ideological 
bargaining space that exists within Parliament. This is even more the case for the members of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, since the Council of Europe considers 
Human Rights and the rights of minorities as two of its main objectives and is actively 
involved in monitoring its member states accordingly.
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 Turkey has been a member since 
1949. Since the Council of Europe presents itself as the guardian of Human Rights, political 
issues are often re-framed as human rights questions. Instead of propagating an ethno-
nationalist message towards the European institutions, the Kurdish movement defends respect 
for individual human rights and demands equal treatment of all citizens within Turkey (see 
also Natali, 2005; Adamson in Al-Ali & Köser, 2003). The case of Sur Municipality is only 
one of many cases that can be seen as examples fitting within this strategy of frame bridging.  
However, it is important to remember that reaching out to multiple policy levels can have a 
transformative effect on the actors and their messages. Adopting a discourse on human rights 
and democratisation leads the actors to incorporate the meaning of that discourse, so that we 
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cannot reduce it to a mere strategic move, but we have to see it as something that is changing 
the actors themselves as well. Thus, while initially this discourse might have been primarily a 
pragmatic choice, over time it grew more important in the general discourse of the political 
party.  
 
The successful exposure of the judicial obstacles the Mayor and his council members have 
encountered, due to the seemingly rightful decision to organize multilingual services, has 
turned the Mayor into one of the central figures in the Kurdish opposition party‟s „foreign 
relations‟ department. Clearly, the Kurdish political activists have learned how rewarding 
lobbying around this case has been in order to increase awareness and support for their 
political positions and goals. So, it was no surprise when, on 2
 
October 2008, the Kurdish 
satellite television Roj-TV broadcasted how Mayor Demirbaş, upon the initiative of the 
Kurdish Institute of Brussels, was honoured by six well-known Flemish politicians from five 
different political parties for his encouragement to increase tolerance and respect for ethnic 
minorities and their right to be served in their mother tongue by the civil servants of their 
municipalities.  This brings us to the importance of the Kurdish associations in the receiving 
states and their networking to access politicians in these states. 
 
European Kurdish associations and multi-level network construction 
Network construction can be a question of mobilizing those who identify with the goals of 
some agent or organization or who share its interests (Cox, 1998). With the support of 
Kurdish associations in the receiving state, Demirbaş‟ case was taken to members of the 
European Parliament and the Council of Europe. As such, the DTP „jumped‟ from a local 
(urban) level of policy-making in southeastern Turkey to that of the immigrants‟ and 
refugees‟ receiving states, and then − via established and newly construed networks with 
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different policy-makers − to the institutions of the European Union.20 These multi-levelled 
networks include local peoples and organizations and demonstrate that what may be perceived 
as a local movement (the Mayor and his council) is never wholly local but produced in part by 
extra-local actors and forces. This recognition confounds perspectives that view „the global‟ 
as powerful and dominant and „the local‟ as powerless and subordinate (Perreault, 2003) and 
calls attention to conceptualizations and configurations of power that have been obviated by 
the dominant rhetoric of order (Parker, 2009). Through the construction of networks over 
multiple levels, local actors can enlarge their spaces of political action considerably.  
 
Without the existence and support of Kurdish associations and federations in the European 
states on the one hand, and global networks such as the UCLG on the other hand, it would 
have been hard for Mayor Demirbaş to access members of the European Parliament and 
members of the Council of Europe. In a state like Belgium, ethnic associations appealing to 
members of a single ethnic community are prevalent (Hooghe,  2005). Since the beginning of 
the 1980s, the Kurdish Institute in Brussels has developed ties with Flemish (and, to a much 
lesser extent, Walloon) politicians, who work either at a regional (Flemish/Walloon/Brussels), 
national (Belgium) or supra-national (European) level. Ever since the foundation of the 
Institute, a strong relationship has existed between the principal figures of the organization 
and the Flemish nationalist parties (with the exception of the extreme right party). These 
parties have long shown sensitivity to problems concerning language rights, and they are 
defenders of a people‟s right to self-determination. The European representative of the DTP in 
Brussels depends to a certain extent on the Kurdish Institute of Brussels and its relations with 
politicians for its lobby work in the European Parliament. In the particular case of Demirbaş, 
the Kurdish Institute of Brussels advised the DTP European representative on who to talk to, 
and meetings were organized via its connections in the cabinet of one of the Flemish MEPs.  
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Over the past few years, Flemish Members of Parliament and the Senate have been taking part 
in a monthly working group on the Kurdish issue in the House of Parliamentarians in 
Brussels, which is part of the Belgian Senate. During these meetings, initiated by the Kurdish 
Institute of Brussels, participants share information about the current developments in Turkey 
and in the Kurdish region. Concerted activities are organized, including conferences and 
delegations to the Kurdish regions in Turkey and Iraq. The possibilities of interpellating 
Belgian Ministers are discussed. One of the group‟s main goals is to put pressure on Members 
of the European Parliament to attach amendments to the EU‟s progress reports on Turkey and 
to write letters of concern to Ministers of European member states and the government of 
Turkey.
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 The variety of state and non-state actors active on different levels and brought 
together in this work group can be regarded as constitutive of a particular political 
configuration that incorporates actors from very different levels of policy-making. Via 
participation in this political configuration, constructed by the efforts of the Institute, a 
political party such as the DTP and its local politicians in Turkey can gain attention and 
influence. Connections with nationally based Kurdish associations (in the receiving states) 
and their networks within a specific state (or states) are indispensable to a political party, like 
the DTP, in its struggle to gain Europe‟s attention. Dependent on only one official European 
representative for all contacts within Europe, the party relies on information and contacts 
provided by Kurdish associations and institutions in their different countries of residence. 
Although this dependency is an advantage for a political opposition party, it also implies that 
these European Kurdish associations (composed mainly of politically active members of the 
Kurdish diaspora), which are part of this political configuration, can weigh significantly on 
the initiatives that are undertaken by the DTP. We cannot explore this further in this paper, 
but clearly this has the effect of limiting the autonomy the party enjoys within Europe.  
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The political configuration formed by the working group constitutes a base from which 
information is diffused and new contacts are brokered to extend the network of influence. As 
such, the members of the working group, who are employed in the cabinets of the Members of 
the European Parliament, arranged formal and informal meetings between the Mayor and 
other members of the European Parliament. Meanwhile, members of Kurdish associations 
supported the Mayor‟s lobby work in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Through these 
political configurations, as well as the efforts of the Greater Municipality of Diyarbakir within 
the World Organization of United Cities and Local Governments, Turkey‟s Kurds have 
established a new space of engagement, outside the boundaries of any one state, but 
nevertheless dependent on access to various actors in multiple states. From this political 
space, the transnational political practices of Turkey‟s Kurds clearly affect the agendas of the 
European Institutions in their relations with Turkey.  
 
Conclusion 
The preceding case study demonstrates how the DTP mobilized resources at multiple levels of 
political organization to set agendas in Europe and bring about change at home. This case 
illustrates the importance of network constructions that imply the transgression of levels of 
policy-making, which, in transnationalism studies, are still too often assumed to be confined 
to the home and receiving states. Transnational practices can transgress borders continuously 
and are organized in a space of engagement that can no longer be regarded as part of any one 
place.  
 
What is more, this particular case sheds light on the importance of discursive framing on our 
understanding of the ways in which transnational political practices can affect the exogenous 
institutions to put pressure on the home state governments. The Kurdish nationalists of the 
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DTP sought to publicize the harassment they faced from the Turkish judiciary, inviting EU 
lawmakers to view the case as a yardstick of democracy in Turkey. By exposing this 
harassment to the outside world − and, more specifically, to members of the States of the 
European Union with whom Turkey is in a bargaining position − and by drawing on the 
complex web of actors assembled through the actions of Kurdish organizations in Europe, the 
pro-Kurdish party can embarrass Turkey and indirectly increase pressure to lift the charges in 
certain much-discussed cases. In this way, Kurdish political activists can stretch the 
boundaries of what is considered legal or illegal and give shape to how they think Turkey 
should be democratized.  Concretely Turkey was scrutinized over the case of Mayor 
Demirbas and the Sur municipality in the EC Commission 2007 Progress Report, in the report 
following the fact-finding mission of the Congress for Local and Regional Authorities of the 
Council of Europe, in the writings of members of European Parliament and in briefings by 
Human Rights Watch on Turkey.  
 
This case, which demonstrates the complex entanglement of a variety of actors distributed 
across multiple levels of political organization, testifies to the importance of multi-level 
networking and the framing of discourses as strategies to change unequal relations of power. 
Moreover, it shows the relevance of these conceptualizations for future studies on 
transnationalism, as following the trajectories towards the networks that constitute this space 
of engagement unravels the multiple agents engaged in transnational political practices over 
multiple spaces and makes one less likely to fall into the trap of methodological territorialism 
that transnationalism has sought to avoid. 
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Notes 
 
1
  It is argued that most of the 1990s asylum seekers from Turkey to Europe were Kurds, as human rights 
violations during the last 25 years were mainly suffered by Kurdish citizens and most cases were related to the 
practices after the military coup of 1980 and the armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers‟ Party (PKK) 
and the Turkish Army (Sirkeçi, 2006: 69). 
 
2
 It is hard to find data on the precise number of Kurdish people living in Turkey and in the diaspora, 
since ethnicity is not officially recorded. Koc et al. estimate the number of Kurdish-speaking people in Turkey to 
be 10.2 million (or 14.4% of the total population of Turkey). This estimation is based on the results of the 2003 
Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS-2003). Through interviews, the TDHS gathered information 
about the mother tongue of 11,950 women in Turkey. This let them determine the „language group‟ these women 
belong to. Other estimates of the number of Kurds in Turkey and in the Middle East are less conservative. In 
1996, for example, McDowall estimated that around 24-27 million Kurds were living in the Middle East, of 
which around 13 million were living in Turkey, which made up about 23% of the total population. An important 
remark made by McDowall is that it is not clear how many of these people actually consider themselves to be 
Kurds, due to the high numbers of people who have assimilated into the Turkish society. However, it is likely 
that, due to the repression of the past few decades, many people have rediscovered their Kurdish identity. This is 
probably the case in Turkey (McDowall, 1996; Van Bruinessen, 1998), as well as in the space of immigration, 
among first and second generation immigrants (Grojean, 2008, Van Bruinessen, 1998). According to many 
Kurdish nationalists, the number of Kurds living in Turkey is no less than 20 million, but most scholars consider 
this to be an exaggeration, and very little evidence supports this number.  
 
3
  Official letter, dated 15 March 2007, addressed to Mr. Abdülkadir Aksu, the Turkish Minister of the 
Interior, signed by 30 members of the European Parliament. 
 
4
  Interview with an active member of the Freedom Initiative in Strasbourg, 27 May 2007. 
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5
  On the political role of the Kurdish mayors in Turkey, see Watts 2006a and 2006b. 
 
6
  DTP is the Demokratik Toplum Partisi or the Party for a Democratic Society, the main pro-Kurdish 
party in Turkey with about 54 democratically elected mayors. The DTP is considered to be the successor of 
DEHAP, HADEP, DEP and HEP. The latter three were closed down during the 1990s and the beginning of the 
current millennium because of alleged separatism. DEHAP disbanded itself before the party was sentenced, and 
its members established the DTP. All DEHAP mayors subsequently joined the newly founded party. At the time 
of this writing, the pro-Kurdish party was again under serious threat of being closed down, and its successor, 
Bariş ve Demokrasi Parti (BDP) or the Party for Freedom and Democracy, had already been established in case 
the verdict demanded the party‟s closure.  
 
7
  Personal observations in European Parliament, Brussels,  8 & 9 May 2007. 
 
8
  Personal observations in the Council of Europe, 27 and 28 May 2007, Strasbourg. 
 
9
  Personal observations in the Council of Europe, 28 May 2007, Strasbourg 
 
10
  Personal observations in the Council of Europe, 28 May 2007, Strasbourg. 
 
11
  Personal observations in the Council of Europe, 27 and 28 May 2007, Strasbourg 
 
12
  Personal observations in the Council of Europe, 28 May 2007, Strasbourg 
 
13
  Interview with member of the Foreign Relations Office of Greater Diyarbakir Municipality,, 27 March 
2008. 
 
14
  The European Charter of Local Self-Government came into force on 9 September 1988. It is the 
instrument of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, in which the signatory 
States undertake to recognise the principle of local self-government in domestic legislation.  At the time of this 
writing, Turkey had not yet signed this charter.  
 
15
  Personal observations, 26 May 2007, Congress for Local and Regional Authorities in the Council of 
Europe, Strasbourg.  
 
16
  Interview with Enlargement Commission member, July 2007, Brussels. 
 
17
  Interview with member of the Ankara delegation to the European Commission, Ankara, April 2008,  
 
18
  Interview with advisor in the Foreign Relations Office of Greater Diyarbakir Municipality,, 27 March 
2008. 
 
19
  See the website of the Council of Europe: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/default_en.asp 
 
20
  It must be added that the networks explored here are only a few of several, interconnected networks. 
The support base in the European Parliament, for example, is broader, especially given the strong relations of the 
DTP with the Greens and United Left/Nordic Green Left fraction, the existence of a friendship group of 
members of diverse fractions, and the DTP‟s membership in the Socialist International and the European 
Socialist Party.  
 
21
     Based upon interviews with the former president of the working group, 9 August 2007, Antwerp and  
several encounters with the director of the Kurdish Institute in Brussels in spring and summer 2007.  
